The Story and Lessons of Travis Childers and MS-01

While the race happened nearly two months ago, I wanted to dedicate a post to the complex special election in Mississippi's First Congressional District. When the race was finally concluded on May 13, Travis Childers, the Democratic candidate, scored a fairly stunning (at least to the broader political establishment which had not been following the race close) victory in a very strongly Republican district in the heart of the Deep South. I happened to follow the race extremely closely from the moment Sen. Trent Lott announced his intention to resign from the Senate and it appeared possible that former Rep. Roger Wicker could be appointed to Lott's seat. I sensed a unique opportunity for the Democrats, not just because of the national environment, but more because of the dynamics and history of the district and the particular strengths of Childers as a candidate.

Therefore, while the race may be old news to many, and Childers is now ensconced in the House of Representatives, I would like to take the time to go over the contest in detail, because I believe it presents tremendous lessons on campaigns and elections, lessons which that go beyond the simple conventional wisdom that Childers won because President Bush is hugely unpopular. Furthermore, Childers' victory presents a successful blueprint that other Democratic candidates should attempt to copy in this election cycle and beyond, particularly former Mississippi Gov. Ronnie Musgrove, who is running a tight contest against now-Senator Wicker.

The First District. Before we get into the race itself, it is valuable to look at the district. For nearly its entire history it has been represented by Democrats, most notably by Jamie Whitten, a longtime chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and one of the longest-serving Members in congressional history, from 1941 until his retirement in 1995. However, Mississippi changed politically along with all of the South even before Whitten retired. Whitten was able to survive as an old-school southern Democrat and with the near-universal support of yellow dog Democrats even as the state became reliably Republican.

Upon the retirement of Whitten, the First District's voters comfortably elected Roger Wicker to the House each term from 1995 until he left for the Senate at the start of 2008. Wicker never faced serious opposition, winning his last election in 2006 by a 66-34 margin. Similarly, like the rest of the state, the district votes reliably Republican in presidential contests, supporting President Bush over John Kerry 62-to-37, and Bush over Gore 59-40. These numbers slightly out-performed Mississippi as a whole, which supported Bush 59-40 in 2004, and 58-41 in 2000. Unfortunately, because Mississippi has not had a competitive Senate race since 1988 (when then-Rep. Trent Lott defeated then. Rep. Wayne Dowdy 54-46), it is not worthwhile to scrutinize the First District's voting patterns in those races. Suffice to say that the First District is conservative and reliably Republican in its Federal voting patterns. This is reflected by its current R+10 Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) score.

The First District takes up most of the northeastern part of state, extending from DeSoto County to the Alabama line in the north, and from Grenada to Columbus (as well as Webster and Choctaw Counties) in the southern part of the district. The National Atlas website provides a good map of the district.

Collectively, the district is made up of 23 separate counties in total (not including tiny Winston County). In order to provide further analysis of the special election, the counties are listed below in order of population size.

DeSoto (137,004 population; 85% white-11% black; $48,000 media household income)
Lee (75,755; 74-25; $36,165)
Lowndes (61,600; 56-42; $32,123)
Lafayette (38,744; 72-25; $28,517)
Monroe (38,014; 68-31; $30,307)
Marshall (34,993; 48-50; $28,756)
Alcorn (34,558; 87-11; $29,041)
Panola (34,274; 51-48; $26,785)
Clay (29,979; 43-56; $27,372)
Pontotoc (26,726; 84-14; $32,055)
Prentiss (25,556; 86-13; $28,446)
Tate (25,370; 68-31; $35,836)
Union (25,362; 84-15; $32,682)
Grenada (23,263; 58-41; $27,385)
Itawamba (22,770; 93-7; $31,156)
Tippah (20,826; 82-16; $29,300)
Chicasaw (19,440; 57-41; $26,364)
Tishomingo (19,163; 95-3; $28,315)
Calhoun (15,069; 69-29; $27,113)
Yalobusha (13,051; 61-39; $26,315)
Webster (10,294; 78-21; $28,834)
Choctow (9,758; 68-31; $27,020)
Benton (8,026; 62-37; $24,149)

As of 2005, the total district population was tabbed at just over 750,000.

As can be seen, demographically, the First District is not terribly wealthy. Its median income is $32,535, slightly over the state average which is just over $31,000. Approximately 62 percent of the district population is rural, though it has several larger cities including Southaven, Tupelo, Columbus, Oxford, and Corinth. Southaven is the fourth largest city in the state, and is the fast-growing region along with DeSoto County as a whole just across the state line from Memphis. The district is 71 percent white, and 26 percent black, while the state as a whole has a ratio of 61-36.

Trent Lott's resignation. On November 26, Sen. Trent Lott shocked the national and Mississippi political establishment by announcing his intent to resign from the Senate before the end of the year. While he did not explicitly say so, many speculated that his sudden resignation was predicated on a new ethics law which was to take affect on January 1, 2008, which would double the time period which a former Member of Congress must wait after leaving office before being allowed to become a registered lobbyist, from one year to two years. (These rumors were substantiated even before Lott left office, as it was revealed that he was planning to form a lobbying firm with former Louisiana Democratic Senator John Breaux). Lott officially resigned on December 18.

Lott's resignation was noteworthy for several reasons. First, he had just been re-elected in 2006, so there were five years remaining on his term. Second, the opening represented an incredibly rare opportunity for Mississippi politicos: indeed, it was only the third true Senate opening the state since 1947 (the first two being Sen. James Eastland's retirement in 1972, and Sen. John Stennis' retirement in 1988). Third, the timing of the opening largely precluded perhaps the state's largest rising star from assuming Lott's mantle. Prior to Lott's announcement, it had been assumed by many that the senior Sen. Thad Cochran was more likely to retire, as he had been in the Senate since 1972, and had lost his Appropriations Committee chairmanship when the Republicans lost their Senate majority in 2006. Much to the consternation of both ambitious Democrats and Republicans, Cochran decided to run for another term. Shortly before Cochran announced his re-election plans, Third District Rep. Chip Pickering, the son of a former well known Federal judge and a huge rising star in both the state and national parties announced that he too would retire from the Senate at the young age of 44 years old.

With a popular Republican governor in charge of the state, Lott would be replaced by a Republican, but Pickering's retirement made it difficult for Gov. Haley Barbour to pick him. This caused some heartburn for Republicans, as Pickering was young enough to hold the seat for decades, had a well-respected name known throughout the state, and was a star conservative with unquestioned political and religious credentials. While Pickering conceivably could have still made a push to get the appointment, he and the governor were undoubtedly in a difficult position. It is worth noting that it is entirely unclear if Pickering made a large push to Barbour to get the appointment.

Nevertheless, as a result of the situation, Rep. Roger Wicker, the more low-key of the two Republicans in the congressional delegation appeared to be the de facto pick for the Gov. Barbour and the Republicans. While some other names were bandied about, ultimately Barbour went with the conventional wisdom and on December 31, tapped Wicker to fill the Senate seat until a special election could be held to determine who would sit in the seat for the remainder of its duration. At 56 years old, Wicker was not as young or as well known as Pickering, but Barbour must have figured that he would be able to hold the seat for the long haul. Additionally, Wicker must have reassured Barbour that he would be a prodigious fundraiser; indeed, his strong ties in Mississippi and Washington were probably good signs to Barbour that Wicker could raise the funds needed to wage a Senate race in what was seen as being a difficult national environment, even in Mississippi (as it was still likely that the Democrats would be able to recruit a strong nominee in either former state Attorney General Mike Moore or the man Barbour ousted in 2003, former Gov. Ronnie Musgrove). The fact that Wicker had never faced a difficult race and had a strong base in the First District was probably also a big plus. Barbour probably had other choices that had better statewide name recognition, including LG Phil Bryant or ex-LG Amy Tuck, but it is not entirely clear that any of them would have been able to wage an effective statewide campaign. Ultimately, as will be seen, Gov. Barbour's decision to tap Wicker would prove to be an enormous error in judgment by one of wiliest political minds in the country.

The special election. Without reflecting on the unique politics of setting the special Senate election, Wicker's resignation from his House to take Lott's seat in the Senate necessitated the need to hold a special election to fill the final year of Wicker's First District House seat. By the filing deadline on January 11, three Republicans and five Democrats filed papers to run for the special election. Only four of them were serious contenders: Glenn McCullough, the former mayor of Tupelo and the former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and Greg Davis, the mayor of Southaven and a former state representative on the GOP side, and Travis Childers, the Prentiss County Chancery Clerk and State Rep. Steve Holland on the Democratic side. McCullough was seen by many as the favorite, and very few believed that the seat was anything more than a safe Republican hold; indeed, Congressional Quarter and the Cook Political Report rated the seat as just that until after the first round of the special general election held over three months later on April 22.

Because of Mississippi's arcane election laws, the First District special election was incredibly complex. There was required to be both party primaries and a general election. However, a candidate had to receive 50 percent plus one in order in order to win in either round. Therefore, if no candidate received that requisite amount in either the primary or the general, then there would have to be a run-off between the two highest vote-getters. Because there were so many candidates running in each primary, as well as a slew of independent and third party candidates on the ballot in the special general race, it was unlikely that any candidate would get 50 percent plus one in either initial primary or general match-up. As a result, there was a real possibility – and one that would be ultimately be realized – that there would be six total races: two primaries and two primary run-offs, and a special general and general run-off.

Two more twists to the process. First, was that the special general election would be non-partisan, and party affiliations would thus not appear on the ballot for either the first round, or a subsequent run-off. Second, in the special general election first round, the names of primary run-off losers would also appear on the ballot, further complicating things. And all of this does not even include the regularly scheduled primary and general election which would take place near the end of 2008!

The first series of votes occurred with the party primaries on March 11. This date was probably chosen in part because it coincided with the presidential primaries, thereby saving money by not having to hold a separate election and ensuring higher voter turnout. Further, Gov. Barbour did not want to hold the special general election on the same day as the presidential race, correctly seeing that Sen. Obama would bring out huge Democratic turnout which could have benefited the Democratic candidate for the seat.

Even with both statewide and First District Democratic turnout (mostly for Sen. Barack Obama) being gigantic, easily dwarfing turnout in the Republican First District primary, neither special primary produced a winner as no candidate on either side broke the 50 percent threshold. On the GOP side, McCullough led Davis 39-37, and Childers led Holland. As a result, an April 1 primary run-off was required.

Regarding the March 11 elections, one intriguing factor should be fleshed out. It has been speculated that turnout in the Democratic primary was higher because under state law, registered Republican voters were allowed to cast ballots in the Democratic race. Many Republicans across the nation, most notably radio host Rush Limbaugh who dubbed his plea "Operation Chaos", implored Republicans to cast their ballots for Sen. Hillary Clinton in order to prolong the Democratic presidential primary. Some have argued that this led many Republicans in the First District to vote in the Democratic primary on March 11 – and for a Democratic candidate in the special congressional primary – and thus not in the GOP race, thereby leading to lower turnout in the first round GOP special primary between McCullough and Davis. This theory is important because under state law, any Republican who crossed party lines in the first round would not be able to vote in the Republican special election primary run-off on April 1. On the April 1 primary run-off, 36,168 people cast votes in the Democratic race between Childers and Holland, while 33,135 cast votes in the GOP primary run-off between McCullough and Davis. Childers defeated Holland 57-43, and Davis scored a fair upset of Davis, winning 51-49. A Childer-Davis match-up was set for April 22. It is impossible to tell if Operation Chaos had any impact.

At this time, it is important to look at the key geographic dynamic inherent in the Republican primary. For most, if not all of the First District's history, it has been represented in Congress by a Member from in and around Tupelo in the center of the district. Southaven and DeSoto County, despite being the largest and fast-growing segment of the district, had never elected the district's representative (indeed, Wicker is from Tupelo). The McCullough-Davis match-up therefore represented a regional battle of sorts, as McCullough hailed from Tupelo while Davis was from Southaven. While this theme did emerge clearly and explicitly during the GOP special primary, it was still a particularly bitter race characterized by many divisions, with Davis attacking McCullough as not conservative enough to represent the district in Congress. Furthermore in a renewal of a longtime rivalry, while most of the state Republican establishment backed McCullough, mostly notably Sen. Thad Cochran, ex-Sen. Lott backed Davis. When all the votes were counted in the primary run-off, the geographic divisions that were somewhat under the surface came into clear focus: McCullough won most of the district, 18 counties to just five for Davis (excluding tiny Winston County), but he lost because Davis dominated in DeSoto and the surrounding counties. Davis garnered nearly half of his votes just from DeSoto County, which had the highest turnout of all the counties. In the aftermath of the primaries, Holland vigorously endorsed Childers and promised to work towards his election. Conversely, the bitterness of the GOP race was clear as McCullough refused to even endorse Davis.

Even after more Democrats voted in both rounds of the special primary, only a few outlets really began to look at the special general, still under the assumption that Davis was a safe pick. Some heads began to turn around April 8 when the Childers campaign released an internal poll showing him leading Davis 41-40.

The lack of attention to Childers as a serious candidate was a serious error. His life and career cut a strong match for the conservative and mostly-rural district. He was the longtime Chancery Clerk for Prentiss County, a small, rural county not far north of Lee County and Tupelo. A chancery clerk is a broad position in Mississippi, and essentially acts as the county's CFO in charge of a great deal of responsibilities. Perhaps more importantly, chancery clerks in the state tend to work together often, and have an opportunity to move around the state and meet fellow clerks. Childers used his position to this exact advantage, and built a strong network of friends and supporters across the state. Indeed, while Mississippi is now a strong Republican state in Federal races, it has many, many Democrats elected to local positions throughout the state, including many chancery clerks. Childers held numerous conservative positions, repeatedly referring to himself as pro-life, pro-gun, and against gay marriage. However, at the same time he labeled himself a "Jamie Whitten" Democrat who supported strands of economic populism and stood against breaks for corporate heads. It was with this image that Childers hoped to tap into rural voters in the district and many of the old, yellow dog Democrats who had become staunch Republicans in recent years but nonetheless had once been Whitten supporters before his retirement in 1995. Childers even came out if favor of withdrawal from Iraq. Finally, Childers presented a compelling life story: after his father died when he was 16 years old, he worked to support his mother, and worked his way through school, becoming a successful realtor and eventually a chancery clerk. Through Childers' geographic base in a rural part of the state near Tupelo and McCullough's own disaffected base, as well as with his heartening life story, Childers presented a formidable candidate.

The campaign was, perhaps predictably, very nasty, with most of the venom being slung from Davis to Childers. Despite the fact that Childers' conservative positions on hot-button social issues neutralized them from attack from the GOP side, Davis ran a traditional Republican congressional campaign in the red south: he worked tirelessly to tie Childers to liberal Democrats like Nancy Pelosi, Ted Kennedy, and Barack Obama. This type of strategy is almost always successful in similar races, and given the district, it was believed that it would be successful for Davis. (For his part, Childers called Davis' strategy "cookie cutter"). I should note, however, that the negativity came from both sides, with state and national Democrats spreading a story (whether true or not), that Davis had ties to the KKK.

Furthermore, Davis had a considerable financial advantage, outspending Childers 2-to-1 before April 22, and between the primary run-offs on April 1 and the special election on April 22, Davis was helped more by the NRCC than Childers was helped by the disinterested and probably-skeptical DCCC, to the tune of $290,000-to-$141,000. It is likely that the DCCC was mostly holding its fire until what it viewed as a likely run-off when it could then weigh in more heavily. This too would turn out to be a mistake, albeit not fatal.

For his part, Childers worked hard to exploit Davis' greatest vulnerability: no, not President Bush's national unpopularity, but the rift that had opened as a result of the Davis-McCullough primary. He campaigned as the rural and working folks' candidate, and rallied against giving the seat to a candidate from Memphis (as Southaven is a Memphis suburb).

On the eve of the April 22 election, the race had begun to receive much more attention from political followers and the national press, and the results were certainly eye-opening. To the Republicans' favor, turnout was down from the April 22 election, with about 33,900 voting for the Democratic candidates on the ballot, and 31,800 voting the Republican candidates (again, an election glitch kept McCullough's and Holland's names on the ballot despite their own respective protestations). As noted above, the gap between total party votes in the primary run-off had been about 3,000 votes.

The good news ended for the Republicans there. Childers garnered 49.4 percent of the vote, just 400 votes shy of an outright majority needed to avoid a run-off. Davis ended up with 46.3 percent. Added together with Holland's votes, Childers percentage was just under 51 percent. Had the DCCC weighed in even a bit more than its paltry $140,000 or so, Childers probably could have won the race outright.

The country break-down of the first round is instructive, as Childers won 15 counties to Davis' eight. Let's take a quick look:

DeSoto (Childers 17 percent-Davis 81 percent)
Lee (58-37)
Lowndes (44-53)
Lafayette (44-51)
Monroe (62-32)
Marshall (62-36)
Alcorn (63-35)
Panola (43-43)
Clay (65-29)
Pontotoc (51-43)
Prentiss (85-13)
Tate (31-65)
Union (56-39)
Grenada (40-54)
Itawamba (59-36)
Tippah (60-37)
Chicasaw (67-27)
Tishomingo (61-35)
Calhoun (54-39)
Yalobusha (46-48)
Webster (35-58)
Choctow (47-47)
Benton (67-30)

Childers did tremendously almost across the board. His tally in Lee County, the traditional "center" of the district where Tupelo is located was impressive and clearly Childers benefited from probably both angry McCullough supporters and people who just wanted to keep the distict in the hands of someone from the area (Childers is from Booneville in Prestiss County, just north of Tupelo). The only reason Davis even forced a run-off was because he ran such up huge margins in his home DeSoto County, which also tried to flex its electoral muscles. However, whereas he got about half of his votes in beating McCullough from DeSoto, he only amassed a third of total there this time around. Childers' totals in Lafayette, Panola, and Grenada County are noteworthy because he probably should have done far better as each of them have huge black populations. I think we can chalk his showing in those counties at least in part to being heavily outspent and probably not having the GOTV resources he needed throughout the district.

The three weeks between April 22 and the final run-off on May 13 were furious and frenetic. Having come so close to winning, the DCCC finally decided to ante up, and dumped enormous sums in the district. Shocked they had come within inches of a historic defeat, the NRCC and the GOP did everything they could to avoid a brutal third special election defeat in 2008. Whereas IL-14(Hastert's seat lost to BIll Foster) and LA-06 (Richard Baker's seat lost to Don Cazayoux) could be explained because of poor GOP recruits (I will return to these races later), a loss in Mississippi one could deliver no such excuse given its R+10 bent, and the fact that Davis, while not perfect, was a decent candidate. The GOP could take heart that the gap between voting Democrats and Republicans over the course of the election(s) had narrowed, and if turnout could fall even more, the GOP would be favored given the redness of the First District. This was a real fear of Democrats, as the run-off represented the fourth election in a couple of months for many people.

Davis continued his attacks on Childers, and Childers continued to campaign on economic issues and high gas prices while emphasizing his own conservative social views and his roots in Booneville versus Davis' roots in the "Memphis." This latter theme got a boast in the final days of the campaign when Vice President Dick Cheney came to Southaven, and referred to it as the "Memphis suburbs." This bothered many rural voters, and probably gave Childers a boast in the final days. Perhaps the most noteworthy event during the final three weeks was an ad Davis put up blasting Childers for not criticizing Sen. Obama over the Rev. Wright controversy. The ad was seen by many a last-ditch effort to create racial divisions and move rural white voters into the GOP column. Even though the ad was condemned by many Democrats as borderline-racist, there were fears that it would be effective; Childers himself cut a response ad saying he had never even met Obama or Wright, and had nothing to do with the controversy. It was unclear what would happen.

When all was said and done, the DCCC ended up dumping close to $2 million into north Mississippi, an unprecedented amount. Because the GOP lacked the DCCC's deep coffers, the NRCC spent around $1.3 million. This does not include the half a million dollars spent by Freedom's Watch, an independent conservative group which aired anti-Childers ads.

Surprisingly, voter fatigue was no factor and the final result was not even close. With turnout exploding over 106,000, Childers crushed Davis 54-46. His numbers were up in just about every county, especially those counties with large percentages of black voters. Childers even did better in DeSoto, upping his percentage to 25 percent, which, while small, represented a key bloc of votes. In the end, the Obama ad seemingly backfired, and Davis was punished for it in the heavy-black counties.

Panola (57-43) +14 Childers from 4/22
Yalobusha (59-41) +13
Tate (43-57) +12
Lafayette (53-47) +9
Lowndes (53-47) +9
Grenada (49-51) +9
Clay (73-27) +8
DeSoto (25-75) +8
Webster (42-58) +7
Chicasaw (73-27) +6
Marshall (68-32) +6
Choctow (53-47) +6
Benton (71-29) +4
Monroe (66-34) +4
Calhoun (58-42) +4
Pontotoc (53-47) +2
Itawamba (60-40) +1
Prentiss (85-15) +0
Lee (58-42) +0
Union (56-44) +0
Tishomingo (60-40) -1
Tippah (59-41) -1
Alcorn (61-39) -2

Notice that I listed the counties in order of how much Childers improved his vote by from 4/22 to the 5/1 run-off, starting with the highest improvement counties to the lowest improvement ones. I suspect that those counties where Childers showed the least improvement -- Lee, Union, Alcorn, Tippah, and Tishomingo -- were squeezed as much as they could be squeezed. Childers did very well in each of them, but for Mississippi, they could only be pushed enough, and Childers probably got as much as he was going to get out of them in the 4/22 first round special. I do not think it is a coincidence that those five counties, excepting Lee, are most of the lowest-percentage black counties in the district. What does that mean? Simply that a very good number of the new voters who came out for Childers in the run-off were probably black voters. (In terms of Lee, this was the county where Davis and the GOP focused on the most between the first round and the run-off. That Childers was able to hold onto his high percentage in a very Republican county and in the face of big GOP GOTV, says a lot, and it is not a big deal that he showed no big improvement in his initial high numbers.) This is supported by looking at Childers' top five best improving counties, as three of them boast particularly high percentages of black voters -- Lowndes, Panola, and Yalobusha. Ditto Grenada, where Childers did not win, but vastly improved his 4/22 showing from 40 to 49 percent. Not mention that Childers got an even better showing from Clay, Chicasaw, and Marshall counties, improving on what was a very strong showing on 4/22. Those were counties that were squeezed hard with good GOTV on 4/22, and were effectively squeezed again for all the Democratic votes they were worth.

Let me make clear a small, but important distinction: I am not arguing that Childers' numbers jumped solely because of huge black support, I am merely making the strong contention that this factor played a big role in his jump in many of these counties, if not a decisive factor. It is difficult to argue otherwise when you look at these improvements and compare the counties to our initial list at the top which delineates the percentage of black voters in each county. This supports the view that the ads trying to tie Childers to Sen. Obama and the Rev. Wright controversy badly backfired. While we probably can never be sure of this, I have a great suspicion that it is true. How else do you explain the county differences between 4/22 and 5/13? After all, the run-off represented the fourth separate election in less than three months, yet there was no sign of voter fatigue as turnout skyrocketed to its highest levels since the presidential primary in Mississippi. Black turnout had to have played a big part.

I guess upon second glance, another lesson could be that negative campaigning really does drive up turnout, despite what angry voters like to say. From my own observations and experience, the old truism that a lot of nasty ads will keep people home is generally wrong; in my opinion, at least, a flood of advertising -- positive or negative -- does well to remind people that a race was happening, which is particularly important in a contest like this where there were multiple stages and the strong possibility of voter fatigue.

While the Republican reaction was one of abject panic, it is not terribly valuable to recap. Rather, we can draw out the reasons Childers won the special election, and the lessons this fascinating campaign provides for the national Democratic Party and similar candidates like Ronnie Musgrove.

Why Did Childers Win?

(1) Geography. Clearly, the unique nature of the district played right into Childers' hands. He was able to play the rivalry between the rural parts of the district against the fast-growing Southaven and DeSoto County to perfection, and it showed as he ended up winning all but a small handful of the district's 24 counties. This was probably the key reason Childers was the victor.

(2) Coherent non-controversial message. Childers was able to present a coherent message during the campaign, while at the same time making clear his conservative social positions to inoculate himself from attacks. As a Democrat, Childers wisely focused on economic issues and a populist message throughout the campaign, talking about the stagnant economy, high fuel prices, and corporate problems in America. While working his way across the First District and in his ads, Childers repeatedly noted that he was pro-life, pro-gun, pro-traditional marriage. In Mississippi, that may be the only way to win as a new candidate and a Democratic candidate, and he did it well.

(3) Davis had no message. On the other side of the coin, Childers' opponent never really articulated a coherent message. From the start of the race, even before the general run-off, Davis ran almost exclusively negative commercials, trying to link Childers to Nancy Pelosi, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama. While this is the general boilerplate strategy employed by Republican candidates in red states, it failed miserably in this race in part because it was coupled with no real message or plan from the Republican. Given the sour national environment, Davis' lack of a message hurt him immensely. Where a party's brand is badly damaged, any new candidate from that party has to open a new playbook and articulate why he or she is different from the standard politician of that party. Davis did the exact opposite.

(4) The nasty GOP primary. This campaign served as a textbook example of the damage that can be wrought by an overly-nasty primary. In the end, it is arguable that the only way Davis could have won was if he went negative after the first round of the primary, and he did squeeze out less than a two-point victory. But his win was Pyhrric as it completely alienated his losing opponent who refused to endorse him for the general. Since Davis was from Southaven at the northwest end of the district, he should have realized even before he won the nomination that he had to make inroads outside of Memphis-south in order to win. His lack of foresight showed at best a poor understanding of the district he was running to represent. Now, we can never know how many votes the divisive primary cost him in the general, but in a close race like this one (at least in the first round of general voting), every vote counts and it certainly could not have helped him.

(5) Childers had the right social views. This might be the easiest thing to understand. Childers was against abortion, against gay marriage, and for strong Second Amendment rights. These days, it is almost impossible for a Democrat to win in any circumstances unless he or she has these views. It is that simple, and it must be a given from the start.

(6) Childers lack of a record was helpful. These may seem counterintuitive on some level, but Childers lack of a legislative record was immensely helpful as a first-time candidate. Because he had no past voting record as a chancery clerk, Davis and the GOP had nothing to attack Childers on. Sure, come November they can use any of his votes against him as they see fit, but during the special election campaign, all they could do was make reach arguments, like saying that Childers was somehow responsible for the Rev. Wright fiasco. There was simply nothing juicy for the Republicans to grab on to.

(7) An energized black turnout. While it is impossible to know how large the black turnout was (there probably was no exit polling done of any kind), clearly Childers numbers between 4/22 and 5/13 exploded in many of the counties with a large black population. Childers was helped by the high black turnout, which was probably spurred to vote in part because of the Rev. Wright commercial. This a good sign for November when having Obama on the ballot will lead to perhaps unprecedented black turnout.

(8) The national GOP brand and Bush hurt Davis (but not fatally). This point was the conventional wisdom immediately after the election: i.e., that Bush's terribly low approval ratings killed Davis. I myself believed that initially that this was the reason that Childers won. However, I no longer feel this way. Sure, the bad economy, high fuel costs, and the tainted GOP brand did not do Davis any favors; there is no question about this. But Bush was probably a small part of this final equation. Polls taken during the campaign pegged President Bush's favorables at "well above" 50 percent in the district. Indeed, Childers' own pollster noted that no one should take the results of the special election as a referendum of Bush. So, the bad environment was helpful to Childers, but it was not the sole reason or a key reason he beat Davis.

Ronnie Musgrove, the Democratic nominee for U.S. Senate facing Roger Wicker should also study this race closely and:

(1) Focus on heavily on local and economic issues, while making clear from the start that he is socially conservative on key issues in order to burnish his credentials. Given his term as lg and his term as governor, he has already done this, and there is strong evidence this is precisely how he is running his campaign so far.

(2) Unlike Greg Davis, Wicker has the benefit of having no divided primary, plus he seems to be wisely running a more positive campaign so far to introduce himself to voters who do not know him, rather than mainly going after Musgrove for his ties to the national Democratic Party. Musgrove will have to adjust to this as appropriate.

(3) In terms of what Wicker can learn, attacking Obama is a dicey proposition, and it's unclear that it can be effective while at the same time not turn out black voters even more. Wicker should know that he must have a positive message. It is also unclear if the long-used approach of focusing on social issues can be effective against Musgrove given Musgrove's own social conservatism. Wicker too will need to focus on economic issues in all likelihood.

There are also some broader lessons national Democrats should do well to glean from Childers' victory

(1) Candidates for a specially-tailored district can actually win. Interestingly, this was something that was lost on the party prior to 2006 when Rep. Rahm Emanuel helped the national party clean up its act and sharpen its focus. For lack of a deeper analysis, Childers was a strong, immensely likable candidate, and his opponent was kind of one-dimensional. More importantly, Childers had the right views for his district. The results in the MS-01 special election should be yet another piece of evidence that you can't dump a liberal Democrat into any district and hope to win, even with a boatload of money. The candidate must fit the district.

(2) Running away from hot-button issues is advisable for Democrats running in red districts and states. This one is pretty obvious. Social issues like abortion or guns are poison for Democrats in red places, as the views of the national party stray far from popular opinion in many of these places.

(3) The impact of national trends is vastly over-played. After Democrats won three special elections this year in fairly Republican districts, many engaged in hyperbole that all of them were the result of a toxic President and GOP brand. This is seemingly logicial considering the magnitude of the wins, but it is not ultimately correct. In IL-14, Bill Foster won 53-47 because his opponent was just plain lousy. Republican Jim Oberweis had run for office in Illinois several times before, losing each time. Polls showed that his favorable numbers were just awful, so it is no surprise he lost. Similarly, Don Cazayoux won 49-46 in LA-06 because his opponent, Woody Jenkins, was also a past loser with very low approval ratings and had well-known ties to white supremacist groups. Finally, as we have gone over, Childers won for a host of reasons unique to his district.

Conclusion: Each race is different, and do not just rely on Bush hate. Each of the three winning Democrats were fairly strong to very strong nominees, but the first two won mostly because they faced bad opponents, and Childers won for the reasons stated ad nauseum. The point being that first, it is dangerous to just assume because President Bush is unpopular nationally, that any Democrat can be put on the ballot in November and win a Republican district or knock-off a longtime GOP Rep. solely because they have a 'D' next to their name.

Second, the broader lesson is that every single district and state and race is different and has its own factors that make it unique. As a result, the national party should carefully evaluate every race on its merits to determine how to win. There is no one-size-fits all approach to politics. Undoubtedly, Bush and the damaged GOP brand will make Democrats' jobs easier this fall, but they must be prepared to win each race in different ways. Childers and Cazayoux did not win solely because of Bush hate, and relying on that myth will just serve to unnecessarily raise Democratic expectations in different contests.